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Kortet på side 15 viser NATO udvidelse, hvis Ukraine og Georgien bliver medlemmer.

The following is an edited transcription of an interview with Russia expert Jens Jørgen Nielsen, by Michelle Rasmussen, Vice President of the Schiller Institute in Demark, conducted December 30, 2021. Mr. Nielsen has degrees in the history of ideas and communication. He is a former Moscow correspondent for the major Danish daily Politiken in the late 1990s. He is the author of several books about Russia and the Ukraine, and a leader of the Russian-Danish Dialogue organization. In addition, he is an associate professor of communication and cultural differences at the Niels Brock Business College in Denmark.

Michelle Rasmussen: Hello, viewers. I am Michelle Rasmussen, the Vice President of the Schiller Institute in Denmark. This is an interview with Jens Jørgen Nielsen from Denmark.

The Schiller Institute released a [[memorandum]][[/]] December 24 titled “Are We Sleepwalking into Thermonuclear World War III.” In the beginning, it states, “Ukraine is being used by geopolitical forces in the West that answer to the bankrupt speculative financial system, as the flashpoint to trigger a strategic showdown with Russia, a showdown which is already more dangerous than the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and which could easily end up in a thermonuclear war which no one would win, and none would survive.”

Jens Jørgen, in the past days, Russian President Putin and other high-level spokesmen have stated that Russia’s red lines are about to be crossed, and they have called for treaty negotiations to come back from the brink. What are these red lines and how dangerous is the current situation?

%%Russian ‘Red Lines’

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Thank you for inviting me. First, I would like to say that I think that the question you have raised here about red lines, and the question also about are we sleepwalking into a new war, is very relevant. Because, as an historian, I know what happened in 1914, at the beginning of the First World War—a kind of sleepwalking. No one really wanted the war, actually, but it ended up with war, and tens of million people were killed, and then the whole world disappeared at this time, and the world has never been the same. So, I think it’s a very, very relevant question that you are asking here.

You asked me specifically about Putin, and the red lines. I heard that the Clintons, Bill and Hillary Clinton, and John Kerry, and many other American politicians, claim that we don’t have things like red lines anymore. We don’t have zones of influence anymore, because we have a new world. We have a new liberal world, and we do not have these kinds of things. It belongs to another century and another age. But you could ask the question, “What actually are the Americans doing in Ukraine, if not defending their own red lines?”

Because I think it’s like, if you have a power, a superpower, a big power like Russia, I think it’s very, very natural that any superpower would have some kind of red lines. You can imagine what would happen if China, Iran, and Russia had a military alliance, going into Mexico, Canada, Cuba, maybe also putting missiles up there. I don’t think anyone would doubt what would happen. The United States would never accept it, of course. So, the Russians would normally ask, “Why should we accept that Americans are dealing with Ukraine and preparing, maybe, to put up some military hardware in Ukraine? Why should we? And I think it’s a very relevant question. Basically, the Russians see it today as a question of power, because the Russians, actually, have tried for, I would say, 30 years. They have tried.

I was in Russia 30 years ago. I speak Russian. I’m quite sure that the Russians, at that time, dreamt of being a part of the Western community, and they had very, very high thoughts about the Western countries, and Americans were extremely popular at this time. Eighty percent of the Russian population in 1990 had a very positive view of the United States. Later on, today, and even for several years already, 80%, the same percentage, have a negative view of Americans. So, something happened, not very positively, because 30 years ago, there were some prospects of a new world.

There really were some ideas, but something actually was screwed up in the 90s. I have some idea about that. Maybe we can go in detail about it. But things were screwed up, and normally, today, many people in the West, in universities, politicians, etc. think that it’s all the fault of Putin. It’s Putin’s fault. Whatever happened is Putin’s fault. Now, we are in a situation which is very close to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which you also mentioned. But I don’t think it is that way. I think it takes two to tango. We know that, of course, but I think many Western politicians have failed to see the compliance of the western part in this, because there are many things which play a role that we envisage in a situation like that now.

The basic thing, if you look at it from a Russian point of view, it’s the extension to the east of NATO. I think that’s a real bad thing, because Russia was against it from the very beginning. Even Boris Yeltsin, who was considered to be the man of the West, the democratic Russia, he was very, very opposed to this NATO alliance going to the East, up to the borders of Russia.

And we can see it now, because recently, some new material has been released in America, an exchange of letters between Yeltsin and Clinton at this time. So, we know exactly that Yeltsin, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs at this time, were very much opposed to it. And then Putin came along. Putin came along not to impose his will on the Russian people. He came along because there was, in Russia, a will to oppose this NATO extension to the East. So, I think things began at this point.

And later on, we had the Georgian crisis in 2008, and we had, of course, the Ukraine crisis in 2014, and, also, with Crimea and Donbass, etc.

And now we are very, very close to—I don’t think it’s very likely we will have a war, but we are very close to it, because wars often begin by some kind of mistake, some accident, someone accidentally pulls the trigger, or presses a button somewhere, and suddenly, something happens. Exactly what happened in 1914, at the beginning of World War I. Actually, there was one who was shot in Sarajevo. Everyone knows about that, and things like that could happen. And for us, living in Europe, it’s awful to think about having a war.

We can hate Putin. We can think whatever we like. But the thought of a nuclear war is horrible for all of us, and that’s why I think that politicians could come to their senses.

And I think also this demonization of Russia, and demonization of Putin, is very bad, of course, for the Russians. But it’s very bad for us here in the West, for us, in Europe, and also in America. I don’t think it’s very good for our democracy. I don’t think it’s very good. I don’t see very many healthy perspectives in this. I don’t see any at all.

I see some other prospects, because we could cooperate in another way. There are possibilities, of course, which are not being used, or put into practice, which certainly could be.

So, yes, your question is very, very relevant and we can talk at length about it. I’m very happy that you ask this question, because if you ask these questions today in the Danish and Western media at all—everyone thinks it’s enough just to say that Putin is a scoundrel, Putin is a crook, and everything is good. No, we have to get along. We have to find some ways to cooperate, because otherwise it will be the demise of all of us.

%%NATO Expansion Eastward

Michelle Rasmussen: Can you just go through a little bit more of the history of the NATO expansion towards the East? And what we’re speaking about in terms of the treaties that Russia has proposed, first, to prevent Ukraine from becoming a formal member of NATO, and second, to prevent the general expansion of NATO, both in terms of soldiers and military equipment towards the East. Can you speak about this, also in terms of the broken promises from the Western side?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes. Actually, the story goes back to the beginning of the nineties. I had a long talk with Mikhail Gorbachev, the former leader of the Soviet Union, in 1989, just when NATO started to bomb Serbia, and when they adopted Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO. You should bear in mind that Gorbachev is a very nice person. He’s a very lively person, with good humor, and an experienced person.

But when we started to talk, I asked him about the NATO expansion, which was going on exactly the day when we were talking. He became very gloomy, very sad, because he said,

[[[begin quote indent]]]

Well, I talked to James Baker, Helmut Kohl from Germany, and several other persons, and they all promised me not to move an inch to the East, if Soviet Union would let Germany unite the GDR (East Germany) and West Germany, to become one country, and come to be a member of NATO, but not move an inch to the East.

[[[end quote indent]]]

I think, also, some of the new material which has been released—I have read some of it, some on WikiLeaks, and some can be found. It’s declassified. It’s very interesting. There’s no doubt at all. There were some oral, spoken promises to Mikhail Gorbachev. It was not written, because, as he said, “I believed them. I can see I was naive.”

I think this is a key to Putin today, to understand why Putin wants not only sweet words. He wants something based on a treaty, because, basically, he doesn’t really believe the West. The level of trust between Russia and NATO countries is very, very low today. And it’s a problem, of course, and I don’t think we can overcome it in a few years. It takes time to build trust, but the trust is not there for the time being.

But then, the nature of the NATO expansion has gone step, by step, by step. First, it was the three countries—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—and then, in 2004, six years later, came, among other things—the Baltic republics, and Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. And the others came later on—Albania, Croatia, etc. And then in 2008, there was a NATO Summit in Bucharest, where George Bush, President of the United States, promised Georgia and Ukraine membership of NATO. Putin was present. He was not President at this time. He was Prime Minister in Russia, because the President was [Dmitry] Medvedev, but he was very angry at this time. But what could he do? But he said, at this point, very, very clearly, “We will not accept it, because our red lines would be crossed here. We have accepted the Baltic states. We have retreated. We’ve gone back. We’ve been going back for several years,” but still, it was not off the table.

It was all because Germany and France did not accept it, because [Chancellor Angela] Merkel and [President François] Hollande, at this time, did not accept Ukraine and Georgia becoming a member of NATO. But the United States pressed for it, and it is still on the agenda of the United States, that Georgia and Ukraine should be a member of NATO.

So, there was a small war in August, the same year, a few months after this NATO Summit, where, actually, it was Georgia which attacked South Ossetia, which used to be a self-governing part of Georgia. The incumbent Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili did not want to accept the autonomous status of South Ossetia, so Georgia attacked South Ossetia. Russian soldiers were deployed in South Ossetia, and 14 of them were killed by the Georgian army. And you could say that George W. Bush promised Georgian President Saakashvili that the Americans would support the Georgians, in case Russia should retaliate, which they did.

The Russian army was, of course, much bigger than the Georgian army, and it smashed the Georgian army in five days, and retreated. There was no help from the United States to the Georgians. And, I think, that from a moral point of view, I don’t think it’s a very wise policy, because you can’t say “You just go on. We will help you”—and not help at all when it gets serious. I think, from a moral point of view, it’s not very fair.

%%A Coup in Ukraine

But, actually, it’s the same which seems to be happening now in Ukraine, even though there was, what I would call a coup, an orchestrated state coup, in 2014. I know there are very, very different opinions about this, but my opinion is that there was a kind of coup to oust the sitting incumbent President, Viktor Yanukovych, and replace him with one who was very, very keen on getting into NATO. Yanukovych was not very keen on going into NATO, but he still had the majority of the population. And it’s interesting. In Ukraine, there’s been a lot of opinion polls conducted by Germans, Americans, French, Europeans, Russians and Ukrainians. And all these opinion polls show that a majority of Ukrainian people did not want to join NATO.

After that, of course, things moved very quickly, because Crimea was a very, very sensitive question for Russia, for many reasons. First, it was a contested area because it was, from the very beginning, from 1991, when Ukraine was independent—there was no unanimity about Crimea and it´s status, because the majority of Crimea was Russian-speaking, and is very culturally close to Russia, in terms of history. It’s very close to Russia. It’s one of the most patriotic parts of Russia, actually. So, it’s a very odd part of Ukraine. It always was a very odd part of Ukraine.

The first thing the new government did in February 2014, was to forbid the Russian language, as a language which had been used in local administration, and things like that. It was one of the stupidest things you could do in such a very tense situation. Ukraine, basically, is a very cleft society. The eastern southern part is very close to Russia. They speak Russian and are very close to Russian culture. The western part, the westernmost part around Lviv, is very close to Poland and Austria, and places like that. So, it’s a cleft society, and in such a society you have some options. One option is to embrace all the parts of society, different parts of society. Or you can, also, one part could impose its will on the other part, against its will. And that was actually what happened.

So, there are several crises. There is the crisis in Ukraine, with two approximately equally sized parts of Ukraine. But you also have, on the other hand, the Russian-NATO question. So, you had two crises, and they stumbled together, and they were pressed together in 2014. So, you had a very explosive situation which has not been solved to this day.

And for Ukraine, I say that as long as you have this conflict between Russia and NATO, it’s impossible to solve, because it’s one of the most corrupt societies, one of the poorest societies in Europe right now. A lot of people come to Denmark, where we are now, to Germany and also to Russia. Millions of Ukrainians have gone abroad to work, because there are really many, many social problems, economic problems, things like that.

And that’s why Putin—if we remember what Gorbachev told me about having things on paper, on treaties, which are signed—and that’s why Putin said, what he actually said to the West, “I don’t really believe you, because when you can, you cheat.” He didn’t put it that way, but that was actually what he meant: “So now I tell you very, very, very, very clearly what our points of view are. We have red lines, like you have red lines. Don’t try to cross them.”

And I think many people in the West do not like it. I think it’s very clear, because I think the red lines, if you compare them historically, are very reasonable. If you compare them with the United States and the Monroe Doctrine, which is still in effect in the USA, they are very, very reasonable red lines. I would say that many of the Ukrainians, are very close to Russia. I have many Ukrainian friends. I sometimes forget that they are Ukrainians, because their language, their first language, is actually Russian, and Ukrainian is close to Russian.

So, those countries being part of an anti-Russian military pact, it’s simply madness. It cannot work. It will not work. Such a country would never be a normal country for many, many years, forever.

I think much of the blame could be put on the NATO expansion and those politicians who have been pressing for that for several years. First and foremost, Bill Clinton was the first one, Madeline Albright, from 1993. At this time, they adopted the policy of major extension to the East. And George W. Bush also pressed for Ukraine and Georgia to become members of NATO.

And for every step, there was, in Russia, people rallying around the flag. You could put it that way, because you have pressure. And the more we pressure with NATO, the more the Russians will rally around the flag, and the more authoritarian Russia will be. So, we are in this situation. Things are now happening in Russia, which I can admit I do not like, closing some offices, closing some media. I do not like it at all. But in a time of confrontation, I think it’s quite reasonable, understandable, even though I would not defend it. But it’s understandable. Because the United States, after 9/11, also adopted a lot of defensive measures, and a kind of censorship, and things like that. It’s what happens when you have such tense situations.

We should just also bear in mind that Russia and the United States are the two countries which possess 90% of the world’s nuclear armament. Alone, the mere thought of them using some of this, is a doomsday perspective, because it will not be a small, tiny war, like World War II, but it will dwarf World War II, because billions will die in this. And it’s a question, if humanity will survive. So, it’s a very, very grave question.

I think we should ask if the right of Ukraine to have NATO membership—which its own population does not really want— “Is it really worth the risk of a nuclear war?” That’s how I would put it.

I will not take all blame away from Russia. That’s not my point here. My point is that this question is too important. It’s very relevant. It’s very important that we establish a kind of modus vivendi. It’s a problem for the West. I also think it’s very important that we learn, in the West, how to cope with people who are not like us. We tend to think that people should become democrats like we are democrats, and only then will we deal with them. If they are not democrats, like we are democrats, we will do everything we can to make them democrats. We will support people who want to make a revolution in their country, so they become like us. It’s a very, very dangerous, dangerous way of thinking, and a destructive way of thinking.

I think that we in the West should study, maybe, a little more what is happening in other organizations not dominated by the West. I’m thinking about the BRICS, as one organization. I’m also thinking about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Asian countries are cooperating, and they are not changing each other. The Chinese are not demanding that we should all be Confucians. And the Russians are not demanding that all people in the world should be Orthodox Christians, etc. I think it’s very, very important that we bear in mind that we should cope with each other like we are, and not demand changes. I think it’s a really dangerous and stupid game to play. I think the European Union is also very active in this game, which I think is very, very—Well, this way of thinking, in my point of view, has no perspective, no positive perspective at all.

%%Diplomacy to Avert Catastrophe

Michelle Rasmussen: Today, Presidents Biden and Putin will speak on the phone, and important diplomatic meetings are scheduled for the middle of January. What is going to determine if diplomacy can avoid a disaster, as during the Cuban Missile Crisis? Helga Zepp-LaRouche has just called this a “reverse missile crisis.” Or, if Russia will feel that they have no alternative to having a military response, as they have openly stated. What changes on the Western side are necessary? If you had President Biden alone in a room, or other heads of state of NATO countries, what would you say to them?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: I would say, “Look, Joe, I understand your concerns. I understand that you see yourself as a champion of freedom in the world, and things like that. I understand the positive things about it. But, you see, the game you now are playing with Russia is a very, very dangerous game. And the Russians, are a very proud people; you cannot force them. It’s not an option. I mean, you cannot, because it has been American, and to some degree, also European Union policy, to change Russia, to very much like to change, so that they’ll have another president, and exchange Putin for another president.”

But I can assure you, if I were to speak to Joe Biden, I’d say, “Be sure that if you succeed, or if Putin dies tomorrow, or somehow they’ll have a new President, I can assure you that the new President will be just as tough as Putin, maybe even tougher. Because in Russia, you have much tougher people. I would say even most people in Russia who blame Putin, blame him because he’s not tough enough on the West, because he was soft on the West, too liberal toward the West, and many people have blamed him for not taking the eastern southern part of Ukraine yet—that he should have done it.

“So, I would say to Biden, “I think it would be wise for you, right now, to support Putin, or to deal with Putin, engage with Putin, and do some diplomacy, because the alternative is a possibility of war, and you should not go down into history as the American president who secured the extinction of humanity. It would be a bad, very bad record for you. And there are possibilities, because I don’t think Putin is unreasonable. Russia has not been unreasonable. I think they have turned back. Because in 1991, it was the Russians themselves, who disbanded the Soviet Union. It was the Russians, Moscow, which disbanded the Warsaw Pact. The Russians, who gave liberty to the Baltic countries, and all other Soviet Republics. And with hardly any shots, and returned half a million Soviet soldiers back to Russia. No shot was fired at all. I think it’s extraordinary.

“If you compare what happened to the dismemberment of the French and the British colonial empires after World War II, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact was very, very civilized, in many ways. So, stop thinking about Russia as uncivilized, stupid people, who don’t understand anything but mere power. Russians are an educated people. They understand a lot of arguments, and they are interested in cooperating. There will be a lot of advantages for the United States, for the West, and also the European Union, to establish a kind of more productive, more pragmatic relationship, cooperation. There are a lot of things in terms of energy, climate, of course, and terrorism, and many other things, where it’s a win-win situation to cooperate with them.

“The only thing Russia is asking for is not to put your military hardware in their backyard. I don’t think it should be hard for us to accept, certainly not to understand why the Russians think this way.”

And we in the West should think back to the history, where armies from the West have attacked Russia. So, they have it in their genes. I don’t think that there is any person in Russia who has forgot, or is not aware of, the huge losses the Soviet Union suffered from Nazi Germany in the 1940s during World War II. And you had Napoleon also trying to—You have a lot of that experience with armies from the West going into Russia. So, it’s very, very large, very, very deep.

Michelle Rasmussen: Was it around 20 million people who died during World War II?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: In the Soviet Union. There were also Ukrainians, and other nationalities, but it was around 18 million Russians, if you can count it, because it was the Soviet Union, but twenty-seven million people in all. It’s a huge part, because Russia has experience with war. So, the Russians would certainly not like war. I think the Russians have experience with war, that also the Europeans, to some extent, have, that the United States does not have.

Because the attack I remember in recent times is the 9/11 attack, the twin towers in New York. Otherwise, the United States does not have these experiences. It tends to think more in ideological terms, where the Russians, certainly, but also to some extent, some people in Europe, think more pragmatically, more that we should, at any cost, avoid war, because war creates more problems than it solves. So, have some pragmatic cooperation. It will not be very much a love affair. Of course not. But it will be on a very pragmatic—

%%The Basis for Cooperation

Michelle Rasmussen: Also, in terms of dealing with this horrible humanitarian situation in Afghanistan and cooperating on the pandemic.

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes. Of course, there are possibilities. Right now, it’s like we can’t even cooperate in terms of vaccines, and there are so many things going on, from both sides, actually, because we have very, very little contact between—

I had some plans to have some cooperation between Danish and Russian universities in terms of business development, things like that, but it turned out there was not one crown, as our currency is called. You could have projects in southern America, Africa, all other countries. But not Russia, which is stupid.

Michelle Rasmussen: You wrote two recent books about Russia. One is called, On His Own Terms: Putin and the New Russia, and the latest one, just from September, Russia Against the Grain. Many people in the West portray Russia as the enemy, which is solely responsible for the current situation, and Putin as a dictator who is threatening his neighbors militarily and threatening the democracy of the free world. Over and above what you have already said, is this true, or do you have a different viewpoint?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Of course, I have a different point of view. Russia for me, is not a perfect country, because such a country does not exist, not even Denmark! Some suppose it is. But there’s no such thing as a perfect society. Because societies are always developing from somewhere, to somewhere, and Russia, likewise. Russia is a very, very big country. So, you can definitely find things which are not very likable in Russia. Definitely. That’s not my point here.

But I think that in the West, actually for centuries, we have—if you look back, I have tried in my latest book, to find out how Western philosophers, how church people, how they look at Russia, from centuries back. And there has been kind of a red thread. There’s been a kind of continuation. Because Russia has very, very, very often been characterized as our adversary, as a country against basic European values. Five hundred years back, it was against the Roman Catholic Church, and in the 17th and 18th Centuries it was against the Enlightenment philosophers, and in the 20th century, it was about communism—it’s also split people in the West, and it was also considered to be a threat. But it is also considered to be a threat today, even though Putin is not a communist. He is not a communist. He is a conservative, a moderate conservative, I would say.

Even during the time of Yeltsin, he was also considered liberal and progressive, and he loved the West and followed the West in all, almost all things they proposed.

But still, there’s something with Russia—which I think from a philosophical point of view is very important to find out—that we have some very deep-rooted prejudices about Russia, and I think they play a role. When I speak to people who say, “Russia is an awful country, and Putin is simply a very, very evil person, is a dictator,” I say, “Have you been in Russia? Do you know any Russians?” “No, not really.” “Ok. But what do you base your points of view on?” “Well, what I read in the newspapers, of course, what they tell me on the television.”

Well, I think that’s not good enough. I understand why the Russians—I very often talk to Russian politicians, and other people, and what they are sick and tired of, is this notion that the West is better: “We are on a higher level. And if Russians should be accepted by the West, they should become like us. Or at least they should admit that they are on a lower level, in relation to our very high level.”

And that is why, when they deal with China, or deal with India, and when they deal with African countries, and even Latin American countries, they don’t meet such attitudes, because they are on more equal terms. They’re different, yes, but one does not consider each other to be on a higher level.

And that’s why I think that cooperation in BRICS, which we talked about, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, I think it’s quite successful. I don’t know about the future, but I have a feeling that if you were talking about Afghanistan, I think if Afghanistan could be integrated into this kind of organization, one way or another, I have a feeling it probably would be more successful than the 20 years that the NATO countries have been there.

I think that cultural attitudes play a role when we’re talking about politics, because a lot of the policy from the American, European side, is actually very emotional. It’s very much like, “We have some feelings—We fear Russia. We don’t like it,” or “We think that it’s awful.” And “Our ideas, we know how to run a society much better than the Russians, and the Chinese, and the Indians, and the Muslims,” and things like that. It’s a part of the problem. It’s a part of our problem in the West. It’s a part of our way of thinking, our philosophy, which I think we should have a closer look at and criticize. But it’s difficult, because it’s very deeply rooted.

When I discuss with people at universities and in the media, and other places, I encounter this. That is why I wrote the latest book, because it’s very much about our way of thinking about Russia. The book is about Russia, of course, but it’s also about us, our glasses, how we perceive Russia, how we perceive not only Russia, but it also goes for China, because it’s more or less the same. But there are many similarities between how we look upon Russia, and how we look upon and perceive China, and other countries.

I think this is a very, very important thing we have to deal with. We have to do it, because otherwise, if we decide, if America and Russia decide to use all the fireworks they have of nuclear [armament] power, then it’s the end.

You can put it very sharply, to put it like that, and people will not like it. But basically, we are facing these two alternatives: Either we find ways to cooperate with people who are not like us, and will not be, certainly not in my lifetime, like us, and accept them, that they are not like us, and get on as best we can, and keep our differences, but respect each other. I think that’s what we need from the Western countries. I think it’s the basic problem today dealing with other countries.

And the same goes, from what I have said, for China. I do not know the Chinese language. I have been in China. I know a little about China. Russia, I know very well. I speak Russian, so I know how Russians are thinking about this, what their feelings are about this. And I think it’s important to deal with these questions.

%%‘A Way to Live Together’

Michelle Rasmussen: You also pointed out, that in 2001, after the attack against the World Trade Center, Putin was the first one to call George Bush, and he offered cooperation about dealing with terrorism. You’ve written that he had a pro-Western worldview, but that this was not reciprocated.

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes, yes. Afterwards, Putin was criticized by the military, and also by politicians in the beginning of his first term in 2000, 2001, 2002, he was criticized because he was too happy for America. He even said, in an interview in the BBC, that he would like Russia to become a member of NATO. It did not happen, because—there are many reasons for that. But he was very, very keen—that’s also why he felt very betrayed afterward. In 2007, at the Munich Conference on Security in February in Germany, he said he was very frustrated, and it was very clear that he felt betrayed by the West. He thought that they had a common agenda. He thought that Russia should become a member. But Russia probably is too big.

If you consider Russia becoming a member of the European Union, the European Union would change thoroughly, but they failed. Russia did not become a member. It’s understandable. But then I think the European Union should have found, again, a modus vivendi.

Michelle Rasmussen: A way of living together.

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes, how to live together It was actually a parallel development of the European Union and NATO, against Russia. In 2009, the European Union invited Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, to become members of the European Union, but not Russia. Even though they knew that there was really a lot of trade between Ukraine, also Georgia, and Russia. And it would interfere with that trade. But they did not pay attention to Russia.

So, Russia was left out at this time. And so eventually, you could say, understandably, very understandably, Russia turned to China. And in China, with cooperation with China, they became stronger. They became much more self-confident, and they also cooperated with people who respected them much more. I think that’s interesting, that the Chinese understood how to deal with other people with respect, but the Europeans and Americans did not.

%%Ukraine, Again

Michelle Rasmussen: Just before we go to our last questions. I want to go back to Ukraine, because it’s so important. You said that the problem did not start with the so-called annexation of Crimea, but with what you called a coup against the sitting president. Can you just explain more about that? Because in the West, everybody says, “Oh, the problem started when Russia annexed Crimea.”

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Well, if you take Ukraine, in 2010 there was a presidential election, and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] monitored the election, and said that it was very good, and the majority voted for Viktor Yanukovych. Viktor Yanukovych did not want Ukraine to become a member of NATO. He wanted to cooperate with the European Union. But he also wanted to keep cooperating with Russia. Basically, that’s what he was like. But it’s very often claimed that he was corrupt. Yes, I don’t doubt it, but name me one president who has not been corrupt. That’s not the big difference, it’s not the big thing, I would say. But then in 2012, there was also a parliamentary election in Ukraine, and Yanukovych’s party also gained a majority with some other parties. There was a coalition which supported Yanukovych’s policy not to become a member of NATO.

And then there was a development where the European Union and Ukraine were supposed to sign a treaty of cooperation. But he found out that the treaty would be very costly for Ukraine, because they would open the borders for European Union firms, and the Ukrainian firms would not be able to compete with the Western firms.

Secondly, and this is the most important thing, basic industrial export from Ukraine was to Russia, and it was industrial products from the eastern part, from Dniepropetrovsk or Dniepro as it is called today, from Donetsk, from Luhansk and from Kryvyj Rih (Krivoj Rog), from some other parts, basically in the eastern part, which is the industrial part of Ukraine.

And they made some calculations that showed that, well, if you join this agreement, Russia said, “We will have to put some taxes on the export, because you will have some free import from the European Union. We don’t have an agreement with the European Union, so, of course, anything which comes from you, there would be some taxes imposed on it.” And then Yanukovych said, “Well, well, well, it doesn’t sound good,” and he wanted Russia, the European Union and Ukraine to go together, and the three form what we call a triangular agreement.

But the European Union was very much opposed to it. The eastern part of Ukraine was economically a part of Russia. Part of the Russian weapons industry was actually in the eastern part of Ukraine, and there were Russian speakers there. But the European Union said, “No, we should not cooperate with Russia about this,” because Yanukovych wanted to have cooperation between the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia, which sounds very sensible to me. Of course, it should be like that. It would be to the advantage of all three parts. But the European Union had a very ideological approach to this. So, they were very much against Russia. It also increased the Russian’s suspicion that the European Union was only a stepping-stone to NATO membership.

And then what happened was that there was a conflict, there were demonstrations every day on the Maidan Square in Kiev. There were many thousands of people there, and there were also shootings, because many of the demonstrators were armed people. They had stolen weapons from some barracks in the West. And at this point, when 100 people had been killed, the European Union foreign ministers from France, Germany and Poland met, and there was also a representative from Russia, and there was Yanukovych, a representative from his government, and from the opposition. And they made an agreement. Ok. You should have elections this year, in half a year, and you should have some sharing of power. People from the opposition should become members of the government, and things like that.

All of a sudden, things broke down, and Yanukovych left, because you should remember, and very often in the West, they tend to forget that the demonstrators were armed. And they killed police also. They killed people from Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions, and things like that. So, it’s always been portrayed as innocent, peace-loving demonstrators. They were not at all. And some of them had very dubious points of view, with Nazi swastikas, and things like that. And Yanukovych fled.

Then they came to power. They had no legitimate government, because many of the members of parliament from these parts of the regions which had supported Yanukovych, had fled to the East. So, the parliament was not able to make any decisions. Still, there was a new president, also a new government, which was basically from the western part of Ukraine. And the first thing they did, I told you, was to get rid of the Russian language, and then they would talk about NATO membership. And Victoria Nuland was there all the time, the vice foreign minister of the United States, was there all the time. There were many people from the West also, so things broke down.

%%Crimea

Michelle Rasmussen: There have actually been accusations since then, that there were provocateurs who were killing people on both sides.

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes. Yes, exactly. And what’s interesting is that there’s been no investigation whatsoever about it, because a new government did not want to conduct an investigation as to who killed them. So, it was orchestrated. There’s no doubt in my mind it was an orchestrated coup. No doubt about it.

That’s the basic context for the decision of Putin to accept Crimea as a part of Russia. In the West, it is said that Russia simply annexed Crimea. It’s not precisely what happened, because there was a local parliament, it was an autonomous part of Ukraine, and they had their own parliament, and they made the decision that they should have a referendum, which they had in March. And then they applied to become a member of the Russian Federation. It’s not a surprise, even though the Ukrainian army did not go there, because there was a Ukrainian army. There were 21,000 Ukrainian soldiers. 14,000 of these soldiers joined the Russian army.

And so, that tells a little about how things were not like a normal annexation, where one country simply occupies part of the other country. Because you have this cleft country, you have this part, especially the southern part, which was very, very pro-Russian, and it’s always been so. There’s a lot of things in terms of international law you can say about it.

But I have no doubt that you can look upon it differently, because if you look it at from the point of people who lived in Crimea, they did not want—because almost 80-90% had voted for the Party of the Regions, which was Yanukovych’s party, a pro-Russian party, you could say, almost 87%, or something like that.

They have voted for this Party. This Party had a center in a central building in Kiev, which was attacked, burned, and three people were killed. So, you could imagine that they would not be very happy. They would not be very happy with the new government, and the new development. Of course not. They hated it. And what I think is very critical about the West is that they simply accepted, they accepted these horrible things in Ukraine, just to have the prize, just to have this prey, of getting Ukraine into NATO.

And Putin was aware that he could not live, not even physically, but certainly not politically, if Sevastopol, with the harbor for the Russian fleet, became a NATO harbor. It was impossible. I know people from the military say “No, no way.” It’s impossible. Would the Chinese take San Diego in the United States? Of course not. It goes without saying that such things don’t happen.

So, what is lacking in the West is just a little bit of realism. How powers, how superpowers think, and about red lines of superpowers. Because we have an idea in the West about the new liberal world order. It sounds very nice when you’re sitting in an office in Washington. It sounds very beautiful and easy, but to go out and make this liberal world order, it’s not that simple. And you cannot do it like, certainly not do it like the way they did it in Ukraine.

Michelle Rasmussen: Regime change?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes, regime change.

%%The Importance of Cultural Exchanges

Michelle Rasmussen: I have two other questions. The last questions. The Russian-Danish Dialogue organization that you are a leader of, and the Schiller Institute in Denmark, together with the China Cultural Center in Copenhagen, were co-sponsors of three very successful Musical Dialogue of Cultures Concerts, with musicians from Russia, China, and many other countries. You are actually an associate professor in cultural differences. How do you see that? How would an increase in cultural exchange improve the situation?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Well, it cannot but improve, because we have very little, as I also told you. So, I’m actually also very, very happy with this cooperation, because I think it’s very enjoyable, these musical events, they are very, very enjoyable and very interesting, also for many Danish people, because when you have the language of music, it is better than the language of weapons, if I can put it that way, of course. But I also think that when we meet each other, when we listen to each other’s music, and share culture in terms of films, literature, paintings, whatever, I think it’s also, well, it’s a natural thing, first of all, and it’s unnatural not to have it.

We do not have it, because maybe some people want it that way, if people want us to be in a kind of tense situation. They would not like to have it, because I think without this kind of, it’s just a small thing, of course, but without these cultural exchanges, well, you will be very, very bad off. We will have a world which is much, much worse, I think, and we should learn to enjoy the cultural expressions of other people.

We should learn to accept them, also, we should learn to also cooperate and also find ways—. We are different. But, also, we have a lot of things in common, and the things we have in common are very important not to forget, that even with Russians, and even the Chinese, also all other peoples, we have a lot in common, that is very important to bear in mind that we should never forget. Basically, we have the basic values we have in common, even though if you are Hindu, a Confucian, a Russian Orthodox, we have a lot of things in common.

And when you have such kind of encounters like in cultural affairs, in music, I think that you become aware of it, because suddenly it’s much easier to understand people, if you listen to their music. Maybe you need to listen a few times, but it becomes very, very interesting. You become curious about instruments, ways of singing, and whatever it is. So, I hope the corona situation will allow us, also, to make some more concerts. I think it should be, because they’re also very popular in Denmark.

Michelle Rasmussen: Yes. As Schiller wrote, it’s through beauty that we arrive at political freedom. We can also say it’s through beauty that we can arrive at peace.

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes, yes.

%%The Role of Schiller Institute

Michelle Rasmussen: The Schiller Institute and Helga Zepp-LaRouche, its founder and international President, are leading an international campaign to prevent World War III, for peace through economic development, and a dialogue amongst cultures. How do you see the role of the Schiller Institute?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Well, I know it. We have been cooperating. I think your basic calls, appeals for global development, I think it’s very, very interesting, and I share the basic point of view. I think maybe it’s a little difficult. The devil is in the details, but basically, I think what you are thinking about, when I talk about the Silk Road, when I talk about these Chinese programs, Belt and Road programs, I see much more successful development that we have seen, say, in Africa and European countries developing, because I have seen how many western-dominated development programs have been distorting developments in Africa and other parts of the world. They distort development.

I’m not uncritical to China, but, of course, I can see very positive perspectives in the Belt and Road program. I can see really, really good perspectives, because just look at the railroads in China, for instance, at their fast trains. It’s much bigger than anywhere else in the world. I think there are some perspectives, really, which I think attract, first and foremost, people in Asia.

But I think, eventually, also, people in Europe, because I also think that this model is becoming more and more—it’s also beginning in the eastern part. Some countries of Eastern Europe are becoming interested. So, I think it’s very interesting. Your points of your points of view. I think they’re very relevant, also because I think we are in a dead-end alley in the West, what we are in right now, so people anyway are looking for new perspectives.

And what you come up with, I think, is very, very interesting, certainly. What it may be in the future is difficult to say because things are difficult.

But the basic things that you think about, and what I have heard about the Schiller Institute, also because I also think that you stress the importance of tolerance. You stress the importance of a multicultural society, that we should not change each other. We should cooperate on the basis of mutual interests, not changing each other. And as I have told you, this is what I see as one of the real, real big problems in the western mind, the western way of thinking, that we should decide what should happen in the world as if we still think we are colonial powers, like we have been for some one hundred years. But these times are over. There are new times ahead, and we should find new ways of thinking. We should find new perspectives.

And I think it goes for the West, that we can’t go on living like this. We can’t go on thinking like this, because it will either be war, or it’ll be dead end alleys, and there’ll be conflicts everywhere.

You can look at things as a person from the West. I think it’s sad to look at Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and those countries, Syria to some extent also, where the West has tried to make some kind of regime change or decide what happens. They’re not successful. I think it’s obvious for all. And we need some new way of thinking. And what the Schiller Institute has come up with is very, very interesting in this perspective, I think.

Michelle Rasmussen: Actually, when you speak about not changing other people, one of our biggest points is that we actually have to challenge ourselves to change ourselves. To really strive for developing our creative potential and to make a contribution that will have, potentially, international implications.

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: Yes. Definitely

Michelle Rasmussen: The Schiller Institute is on full mobilization during the next couple of weeks to try to get the United States and NATO to negotiate seriously. And Helga Zepp-LaRouche has called on the U.S. and NATO to sign these treaties that Russia has proposed, and to pursue other avenues of preventing nuclear war. So, we hope that you, our viewers, will also do everything that you can, including circulating this video.

Is there anything else you would like to say to our viewers before we end, Jens Jørgen?

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: No. I think we have talked a lot now. Only I think what you said about bringing the U.S. and Russia to the negotiation table, it’s obvious. I think that it should be, for any prudent, clear-thinking person in the West, it should be obvious that this is the only right thing to do. So of course, we support it 100%.

Michelle Rasmussen: Okay. Thank you so much, Jens Jørgen Nielsen

Jens Jørgen Nielsen: I thank you.

Mod Moder Naturs luner hjælper kun udbygning af infrastrukturen. 

  

Af Alexander Hartmann 

  

Efter den forgangne uges katastrofale regnskyl, der kostede over hundrede mennesker livet i Eifel og Rheinland og udslettede hele landsbyer i styrtfloder, fremkom der, som forventeligt, straks alle mulige røster, der gjorde de “menneskeskabte klimaændringer” ansvarlige for katastroferne og krævede endnu stærkere forholdsregler for at nedsætte CO2-udslippet. 

Det er dog en kendsgerning, at der også tidligere har forekommet oversvømmelser, tørke og andre ekstreme vejrforhold, og der vil fortsætte med at gøre det i fremtiden, med eller uden klimaændringer. Den hidtil værste oversvømmelse i Mellemeuropa, den såkaldte Magdalene-oversvømmelse, fandt sted i 1342, altså længe før forøgelsen af CO2-mængden i atmosfæren.  

Dengang stod vandet inde i domkirkerne i Würzburg og Mainz, og langs Rhinen, Main, Weser og Elben overskylledes byerne af vandmasserne, og tusindvis af mennesker mistede livet. 

Naturligvis skal de ramte mennesker have hjælp så hurtigt som muligt, og de påkrævede midler skal stilles til rådighed omgående. Genopbygningen af infrastrukturen skal sørge for, at de ramte virksomheder også genopbygges, så at folk i området får deres arbejdspladser og dermed deres eksistensgrundlag tilbage. Målet må være, at det skal gå de ramte mennesker bedre efter genopbygningen end før katastrofen. 

Men først og fremmest må vi drage de rigtige konsekvenser af katastrofen, så at vi er bedre forberedte på tilsvarende situationer i fremtiden. Om sådanne naturfænomener, som vi altid må regne med muligheden af, udvikler sig til katastrofer, afhænger først og fremmest af, om menneskene har anskaffet sig den nødvendige infrastruktur i tide, der gør det muligt at bestride dem. Vi har ikke brug for et diffust “klimaværn”, men for konkrete forholdsregler til beskyttelse af menneskene. 

For at opnå dette, må mennesket, selv om dette ikke behager De Grønne, gribe ind i naturen. I den uberørte natur er mennesket udleveret til naturens nåde; alle civilisationer beror på, at mennesket omformer naturen og gør sig stadig mere uafhængigt at dens luner. 

Netop det har vi gjort alt for lidt af i de sidste årtier, især under indflydelse af den grønne ideologi, men også under påvirkning af spareapostlenes “balancerede budget”, af profeterne for “de frie markedskræfter”, af finansspekulanterne og Davosmilliardærerne. I stedet for at opbygge, sparede man, og man opgav og ødelagde tilmed værdifulde indretninger – som for eksempel kernekraftværker – i miljø- og klimabeskyttelsens navn og erstattede dem med vind- og solkraftværker, der først for alvor overlader vor energiforsyning til naturens luner. 

Rent faktisk er én af de værste katastrofer, der kan ramme os, et vidtstrakt og længevarende nedbrud af strømforsyningen, hvis følger langt il overgå den forløbne uges oversvømmelseskatastrofe. Alligevel skal her efter kernekraftværkerne nu også kulkraftværkerne nedlægges og udbygningen af den omskiftelige og upålidelige “vedvarende” energi fremskyndes og udvides. 

  

EU’s Klimapakke 

  Blandt de drivende kræfter for denne politik finder man ikke mindst den Europæiske Kommission med dens overhovede, præsident Ursula von Leyen. Hun har netop fremlagt nye planer til beskyttelse af klimaet, den såkaldte “Klimapakke”. I hovedsagen drejer det sig om, at handelen med CO2-udslip ikke blot skal anvendes på udslip fra industrien, men også på trafik, fly, bygninger og endnu mere. 

Forkvinden for borgerretsbevægelsen Solidarität, Helga Zepp-LaRouche, kommenterede meget rammende denne pakke den 15. juli på sit internationale internetforum således: Af disse forslag er det ene mere forrykt og uigennemførligt end det andet…. Når man ser nærmere på det, vil det føre til et altoverskridende bureaukrati, til ufattelige regler…. det bliver et fuldstændigt mareridt. Og som endeligt resultat, så bliver alting meget dyrere. Det gør produktionen dyrere. Det vil ruinere de energiintensive industrier. Det vil gøre det at bo i et hus utåleligt dyrt. Det er et fuldstændigt vanvittigt forslag.” 

For eksempel vil EU-kommissionen fra 2036 af stoppe salg og fremstilling af forbrændingsmotorer; fra da af skal kun “CO2-frie” nye køretøjer tillades. “Det kommer ikke til at fungere” understregede Helga Zepp-LaRouche, “for at bygge denne form for alternative energikilder i form af solfangere og vindmølleparker, vil man for Europa sådan groft taget have brug for et ekstra område mindst af Portugals størrelse. Hvor vil de tage det fra? Fra byerne? Fra landbruget? Fra skovene? Hvor vil de få al den plads fra? Der er vanvittige forslag om at opføre sådanne vindmølle- og solcelleparker i Afrika og transportere strømmen til Europa.” 

Denne “Klimapakke” fra EU, konstaterede hun, kunne kun være udtænkt af folk, “der ikke har nogen interesse i mennesker, for hvem udviklingslandenes udvikling er komplet ligegyldig, men som vil fortsætte det koloniale system. 

Her kritiserede hun i særlig grad Mark Carney, FN’s klimabeskyttelsesrepræsentant og tidligere chef for Bank of England, som havde foreslået at købe CO2-udledningsrettigheder af den tredje verdens lande, hvis disse ellers vil forpligtige sig til at give afkald på økonomisk udvikling og udvikling af landbruget. Rent faktisk eksisterer der allerede en sådan aftale mellem Norge og Gabon, hvor Gabon har forpligtet sig til at give afkald på en fortsat udvikling af sine regnskove – der udgør 90% af landets areal. De må ikke udvikle deres egne ressourcer og skal endda lade landbrugsområder springe i skov; til gengæld får de latterlige 150 millioner euro over 10 år.! Helga Zepp-LaRouche: “Jeg finder dette absolut afskyeligt og håber, at flertallet af Jordens mennesker vil sætte deres berettigede vilje igennem og kræve deres ret til udvikling.” 

Hun henviste til de menneskers hykleri, der bebrejder andre regeringer deres overtrædelser af menneskerettighederne, men selv vil berøve hele kontinenter retten til udvikling. “Når man hele tiden befinder sig på tærsklen til at dø, fordi man ikke har nok at spise, ikke har noget rent vand, så er det efter min mening den største krænkelse af menneskerettighederne, man kan forestille sig. Der er ingen frihed, for når man må kæmpe hver dag for bare at overleve endnu en dag, så kan man ikke tale om frihed.” 

Hungersnød for klimabeskyttelse? 

Hvor forkastelig denne politik egentlig er, viser et kik på den globale ernæringssituation: Godt 800 millioner mennesker på Jorden er underernærede, og allerede i april advarede direktøren for Verdensernæringsprogrammet (WFP), David Beasley, om, at tallet på de mennesker, der er umiddelbart truede af sultedød – ikke mindst på grund af de økonomiske følger af COVID-pandemien – vil kunne nå 260 millioner allerede i dette år. 

Kun en kraftig forøgelse af fødevareproduktionen, især i de underudviklede lande, kan løse dette hungerproblem. Og alligevel vil EU-kommissionen sænke fødevareproduktionen inden for rammerne af deres program “Farm to Fork” (“fra gård til bord”) i klimabeskyttelsens navn, og det ikke blot inden for EU, men også i leverandørlandene og om muligt endda i hele verden. Dette ville så rent faktisk være en “menneskeskabt katastrofe”: en bevidst fremkaldt massedød.” 

Helga Zepp-LaRouche henvendte sig derfor i sit forum til alle seere: “Jeg vil godt bede jer alle sammen: Lad være med bare at være passive tilskuere! Det er faren ved en ny fascisme: Økodiktatur er et mildt ord for det, som disse folk har på sinde, og det må besejres, før det virkeligt kan ødelægge hele verden og civilisationen.” 

  

Alternativet 

Også hungersnøden kan undgås. I stedet for at ofre menneskene af hensyn til “Klimabeskyttelsen” burde vi koncentrere os om det store projekt: at overvinde fattigdommen, farsoterne og sulten i verden. Til det formål må der skabes godt 1,5 milliarder nye arbejdspladser i hele verden, begyndende med sundhedssektoren, for at forsyne alle mennesker med tilstrækkelig føde, rent drikkevand og elektricitet. Og til det formål må industriproduktionen fordobles inden for næsten alle områder i hele verden – en stor mulighed for at genopbygge og modernisere vor egen økonomi og atter få den op i den økonomiske verdensklasse. 

Kina og Rusland er gået med i Bælte- og Vej-initiativet (BRI) i den retning. Det er påtrængende nødvendigt, at Tyskland og Europa tager del i det fremfor at forfølge en konfrontationskurs mod Rusland og Kina, der først og fremmest skader os selv og kan drive verden ud i en nuklear konflikt. Verden har brug for traktorer frem for kampvogne! 

  

(Alexander Hartmann er chefredaktør for ugebladet Neue Solidarität og delstatsformand for BüSo Hessen. Han er kandidat i Wiesbaden til valget til den tyske forbundsdag.) 

 

Billede: Romaine, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

6. februar 2020 – I går blev et seminar med titlen ”Hvad er det næste skridt for Kina og Europa?” afholdt af det Danske Institut for Internationale Studier (DIIS). Talerne var fra DIIS (”Danmarks Kina-udfordring”); det tyske Mercator Institut for Kina-studier (”Søgen efter Europas Kina-strategi”); det tyske Globale Offentlige Politiske Institut (”Tyskland og Huawei-debatten”) angående 5G; og det britiske Internationale Institut for Strategiske Studier (”Kina, EU’s forsvar og sikkerhed, og nyopstående teknologier”). Seminarets hovedindhold handlede om Kinas (angivelige) trussel mod Europa, og de europæiske politikeres modvilje mod at udfordre dette af frygt for at miste deres handel med kineserne.

I løbet af spørgerunden intervenerede en repræsentant for Schiller Instituttet. Efter at have tilkendegivet hvor hun kom fra, sagde hun, at talerne havde modstillet økonomisk samarbejde på den ene side, og geopolitik og strategiske interesser på den anden, men vi har en anden forestilling. Efter mordet på den iranske general opfordrede Schiller Instituttets leder til et omgående topmøde mellem Xi Jinping, Trump og Putin, hvorefter Putin havde udvidet dette til at inkludere Storbritannien og Frankrig for at forhindre en geopolitisk konfrontation. Økonomisk udvikling må være en del af dette, inklusive mere europæisk samarbejde med Bælte- og Vejinitiativet samt økonomisk udvikling i Mellemøsten og Afrika. Hvad med økonomisk udvikling som en måde at mindske strategiske konflikter på, og dermed skabe en håbefuld fremtid gennem økonomisk samarbejde?

Taleren fra MERICS, som har spillet en negativ rolle i Kina-debatten i Tyskland, indledte sine bemærkninger med at sige, at hun gerne ville vide mere om Schiller Instituttets arbejde om og med Kina. Men selvom handelsrelationer vil fortsætte, hvilket vi ønsker, så begyndte vi i 2016 at se de geopolitiske konsekvenser af Kinas investeringer i Europa, da Grækenland og Ungarn udvandede EU’s kritiske erklæring om Kinas opførsel i det Sydkinesiske Hav, fordi de ikke ønskede at ophidse Kina; og visse Bælte- og Vejprojekter her havde ikke overholdt EU’s spilleregler.

Seminaret blev sendt live, og en video kan ses på: https://www.diis.dk/node/15207, så flere personer end dem tilstede i lokalet har hørt udvekslingen. Schiller Instituttets spørgsmål begynder efter 2 timer og 35 minutter.

Schiller Instituttets danske nyhedsbrev, som indeholder Helga Zepp-LaRouches opfordring til topmødet, blev uddelt, og en række kontakter blev etableret.

Jeg ville ønske, at fornuft ville indtræde i hovedet på nogle af de europæiske regeringer, og at de simpelt hen ville gå sammen i fællesskabet. Jeg har ikke set noget tegn på dette. Faktisk har den tyske EU-kommissær for budget og menneskelige resurser, Günter Öttinger, netop sagt, at Europa ikke bør være »fort Europa«, men at vi bør bringe udvikling til Afrika. Men så sagde han, at vi bør gøre dette for ikke at overlade det afrikanske kontinent til kineserne, som blot ville forfølge deres egne, egoistiske mål. Og så længe denne idiotiske tankegang er fremherskende, tror jeg ikke, der findes nogen løsning.

Folk bør indse, hvad det er, Kina gør, og holde op med at have disse fordomme. For, hvis man sammenligner den moralske kvalitet af det, Kina gør for sit eget folk og for andre nationer, så er det himmelvidt overlegent i forhold til det, Vesten foretager sig.

 

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Xi Jinping har, i alle sine skrifter, i alle sine taler, understreget, at dette »fællesskab for menneskehedens fælles fremtid« er baseret på total respekt for det andets lands suverænitet, total respekt for den andens samfundssystem, og der kommer ingen bestræbelse på at påtvinge noget andet land den kinesiske model. Det er ganske enkelt, at Kina har tilbudt især udviklingslandene at hjælpe dem til at overvinde deres underudvikling. Det er et win-win-samarbejde, hvilket er grunden til, at 140 lande i mellemtiden samarbejder med dette, for det er naturligvis i Kinas interesse – for det er en stor befolkning, et stort land, en meget rig kultur, 5.000 års meget rig kulturtradition, så det er et af verdens store lande, og måske endda det vigtigste, i betragtning af dets befolknings størrelse.

Men de påtvinger ikke nogen det, de anser for at være »kinesiske karaktertræk« – helt forskelligt fra de neokonservative og de neoliberale, der havde regimeskifte, ’farvede revolutioner’, eksport af ’demokrati’ og det, de kalder »menneskerettigheder«. Folk bør virkelig ikke være fordomsfulde, men bør se på det med friske øjne, selv læse Xi Jinpings taler. …

 

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22. feb., 2018 – Den 14. feb. godkendte Estlands Ministerium for Offentlig Administration planen for Rail Baltica (RB) højhastigheds-jernbanelinjen, som vil fuldføre den endelige rute og det foreløbige design for hele jernbanen i de tre baltiske stater, rapporterede International Railway Journal den 16. feb.

Rail Baltica-projektet omfatter byggeriet af 870 km elektrisk normalsporsjernbane, der forbinder de tre baltiske hovedstæder Tallinn, Estland; Riga, Letland og Vilnius, Litauen, med en forbindelse til det europæiske normalsporsnetværk i Polen. Jernbanen designes til at operere med 240 km/t for passagertog og 120 km/t for fragttog, og vil udgøre en del af EU’s Nordsøen/Baltikum TEN-T-korridor (Transeuropæiske Transportnetværk ).

Fr. Baiba Rubesa, adm. dir. og forkvinde for RB Rail, sagde til International Railway Journal, at »Vi har nu færdiggjort planlægningsstadiet for Rail Baltica. Næste skridt er at fokusere på det konsoliderede foreløbige tekniske design og detaljerede tekniske design for Rail Baltica infrastrukturen i alle tre lande.«

Billede: Rail Baltica vækstkorridor, som en del af Nordsøen/Baltikum-korridoren.

29. aug., 2017 – I går meddelte USA’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), at det havde gennemført sin anden flyvetest af B61-12 atom-tyngdekraftbombe. Testen, hvor to komplette bomber – minus den fysiske atompakke, der får bomben til at eksplodere – blev nedkastet fra et F-15E angrebsfly, »evaluerede våbnets ikke-atomare funktioner og flyets evne til at kaste våbnet«, iflg. NNSA’s pressemeddelelse.

Ud over at erstatte forældet elektronik, tilføjer B61-12 en Præcision Guidance Kit (PGK) til forbedret nøjagtighed, samt en funktion, der kaldes »dial-a-yield« (hvilket vil sige, at man kan tilpasse sprængstofmængden til f.eks. et mindre mål – som f.eks. ikke er en millionby), og som kritikere siger sænker tærsklen for anvendelse af atomvåben.

»Den kendsgerning, at man gennemfører test af denne modifikation af atombomben, indikerer, at USA fortsætter et accelereret oprustningsprogram af sit taktiske atomarsenal i Europa, såvel som også, at både Washington og Bruxelles overvejer et scenario med begrænset atomkrig i Europa«, sagde den russiske militæranalytiker Igor Korotchenko til RIA Novosti.

Mikhail Ulyanov, direktør for det Russiske Udenrigsministeriums Afdeling for Ikke-spredning og Våbenkontrol, sagde til RT: »Amerikanske militærspecialister hævder, at denne bombe vil være mere etisk og mere anvendelig, fordi den har en større nøjagtighed og resulterer i mindre katastrofale følger for civile, hvis den bruges over store områder. Dette afstedkommer den konklusion, at, når de anvendes operationelt, så kan sådanne bomber objektivt set sænke tærsklen for anvendelse af atomvåben. Vi ser dette som en negativ hovedeffekt af det igangværende opgraderingsarbejde.«

Ulyanov påpegede ligeledes, »De seneste variationer af B61-12 bomberne er også designet til deployering til territorier i flere NATO-lande i Europa, til brug for en del af de såkaldte atommissioner, der involverer piloter fra alliancens atomvåbenfri medlemslande. Ifølge vores vurdering, så er dette i modstrid med forpligtelserne i Traktaten om ikke-spredning af kernevåben.«

Produktion af B61-12 forventes at begynde i marts 2020.

Foto: B61-træningsenhed, beregnet til jordbesætning. Den kopierer nøjagtigt formen og størrelsen af en »live« B61 (sammen med dens sikkerheds-/væskemekanismer), men indeholder kun inerte materialer.

7. maj, 2017 – Paul Craig Roberts (økonom, journalist; tidl. vicefinansminister under præsident Reagan) fordømte i en artikel på sin webside den 3. maj, »Hvad ’krisen’ over Nordkorea virkelig handler om«, deployeringen af THAAD ballistisk missilforsvarssystem i Sydkorea, som værende en forberedelse fra USA’s side til et førsteslags-atomangreb mod Rusland og Kina. Han afviste den officielle retfærdiggørelse, der går ud på, at dets formål er at beskytte Sydkorea fra Nordkorea, som et »røgslør«, som russerne og kineseren er sig udmærket bevidst.

Roberts sammenlignede dette med det, man gjorde mod Iran, for at retfærdiggøre et ballistisk missilforsvarssystem i Europa, der er rettet mod Rusland. »Washington hævdede, at anti-ABM-baser ikke var rettet mod Rusland, men var for Europas beskyttelse mod Irans interkontinentale ballistiske atommissiler. Amerikanere, der ikke mistænkte noget, troede muligvis på dette, men det gjorde russerne ganske bestemt ikke, eftersom Iran hverken har interkontinentale ballistiske missiler eller atomvåben.«

På samme måde »har THAAD intet som helst at gøre med Nordkorea, der deler grænse med Sydkorea, hvilket gør det fuldstændig meningsløst for Nordkorea at angribe Sydkorea med ICBM’er«. Roberts tilføjede: »Med andre ord, så er Washington i færd med at skabe et skjold mod atomgengældelse fra både Rusland og Kina, mod et amerikansk [førsteslags] atomangreb mod begge disse lande.«

Roberts konkluderede: »THAAD i Sydkorea er rettet mod Kinas gengældelsesstyrker. Det er en del af Washingtons forberedelser til at ’nuke’ både Rusland og Kina, med minimale konsekvenser for USA, selv om Europa med sikkerhed ville blive totalt ødelagt, da THAAD eller anti-ABM’er er nytteløse imod russiske atomkrydsermissiler og det russiske luftvåben. Spørgsmålet er nu: Nu, da Rusland og Kina har forstået, at Washington forbereder et førsteslags-atomangreb imod dem, med det formål at fjerne de to begrænsninger for Washingtons ensidige adfærd, vil de to lande sætte sig ned og vente på angrebet?«

Desværre stopper Roberts’ artikel ved dette spørgsmål, og (som det er hans vane) undlader at tage i betragtning, både det britiske ophav til faren, og den skiftende strategiske relation mellem Trump-administrationen, Kina og Rusland, der har potentialet til at slukke lunten i det scenarie, han i øvrigt korrekt afbilder.

Foto: THAAD, Sydkorea.       

… Men i Europa har vi et politisk lederskab, som man kunne sige ligesom sidder fast i en tidslomme. I denne tidslomme går resten af verden fremad, og de sidder fast i denne tidslomme, denne glasklokke, som de bliver ved med at støde hovedet imod. Og derfor spiller vores organisation, Schiller Instituttet og vore allierede organisationer i Europa, en nøglerolle som lederskab for at bringe Europa ind i dette nye paradigme.

Næstformand Michelle Rasmussen havde følgende indlæg og spørgsmål på LaRouche PAC’s borgermøde på Manhattan, New York, lørdag, 1. april:

Jeg er Michelle Rasmussen, og jeg arbejder for Schiller Instituttet i Danmark og er her på besøg. Jeg vil gerne give et øjebliksbillede af, hvordan tingene ser ud fra Europa, for det er ligesom folk i Europa står på usikker grund: På den ene side har man, mod øst, det nye paradigme, der anføres af Kina med Rusland og de andre centraleurasiske lande, der er involveret i Bælt & Vej-politikken. Og på den anden side, mod vest, har man potentialet for, at USA rent faktisk ændrer sin politik. Mod øst har vi en konkret transformation. Mod vest ville jeg sige, at der mest er et potentiale for en transformation, med tale om det Amerikanske System, infrastruktur, Glass-Steagall, med ideen om at få et nyt forhold til Rusland; samt de meget spændende udsigter med topmødet mellem Xi Jinping og præsident Trump; Trumps NASA-tale, osv.

Men i Europa har vi et politisk lederskab, som man kunne sige ligesom sidder fast i en tidslomme. I denne tidslomme går resten af verden fremad, og de sidder fast i denne tidslomme, denne glasklokke, som de bliver ved med at støde hovedet imod. Og derfor spiller vores organisation, Schiller Instituttet og vore allierede organisationer i Europa, en nøglerolle som lederskab for at bringe Europa ind i dette nye paradigme. For vi har en lille organisation i nogle af landene, og vores politik har altid været, at vi ikke nødvendigvis forventer, at de europæiske lande vil vise vejen, men at vi måtte så frøene for LaRouche-programmets politik for den dag, hvor USA tager skridt til det. Så måtte vi have sået frøene, så de europæiske lande kunne komme med.

Det er, hvad vi gør. Vi har, f.eks., ganske kort, i Italien haft omkring 12 forskellige lovforslag for Glass/Steagall-bankopdeling i løbet af de seneste tre år. Alle partierne, undtagen det førende parti, er for Glass/Steagall-bankopdeling, og for blot to uger siden begyndte man omsider at drøfte det i parlamentsudvalget.

I Frankrig har vi en enorm chance i de næste fire uger, med Jacques Cheminades kampagne, der er i færd med at opbygge en national bevægelse. De har kontaktet 30.000 borgmestre for at skaffe 500, der ville støtte Jacques. Han vil få massiv lejlighed til at komme i medierne. Hans program vil blive uddelt til hver eneste husstand i Frankrig. Dette sker inden for de næste fire uger.

I Tyskland har vi netop haft en vellykket Krafft Ehricke-konference om udforskning af rummet. I Berlin har vi en valgkampagne.

I Sverige er Glass-Steagall netop blevet diskuteret i det svenske parlament, for en eller to uger siden; forslaget blev nedstemt, men det blev diskuteret. Og vore folk i Sverige lavede en indsats for at forsøge at standse krigen mod Yemen, og vi har Hussein, vores leder i Sverige, der arbejder med den arabiske version af vores Verdenslandbro-rapport.

Og i Danmark, som I hørte for et par uger siden, havde vi et vidunderligt gennembrud med koncerten for en dialog mellem kulturer, hvor folk hang oppe under loftet, så mange mennesker kom; og den vidunderlige udveksling af traditionel musik fra hele verden, inkl. fra Rusland og Kina, og også med europæisk opera og klassisk musik.

I parentes bemærket, så blev Alexander Hamilton født i Vestindien; han blev født på en britisk ø og voksede op på Sankt Croix, som var en dansk ø. Den danske statsminister, der netop har mødt Trump, besøgte i denne uge Jomfruøerne, fordi det er 100 år siden, danskerne solgte Jomfruøerne til USA. Alexander Hamilton voksede op på Skt. Croix [USVI], der dengang var en dansk koloni, og det har en vigtig indflydelse i amerikansk historie, for Alexander Hamilton var ikke fra nogen delstat! Alle de andre kæmpede for deres egen del, vores stat først, vores stat først. Men Alexander Hamilton stod over dette, han opererede ud fra standpunktet om principperne for frihed, og hans bestræbelser på at etablere en centralregering har forbindelse til dette: han var ikke bundet til en bestemt delstat. Det var blot en parentes.

Men, hvordan ser I virkningen af dette skifte i USA’s politik på resten af verden, der endnu ikke er i det nye paradigme?

Diane Sare: Jeg tror, det bliver meget ulige fordelt, for steder synes at have en masse fraktioner, som vi ser det i Tyskland, hvor der er folk, der virkelig gerne vil arbejde sammen med Rusland, især industrifirmaer osv. – og så er der Merkel. Så jeg tror, det bliver et chok, hvis vi får USA til at skifte politik, det bliver et virkeligt chok. Og jeg tror, det vil styrke folk, der ved, hvad der er rigtigt. Som ikke ønsker krig, som mener, de bør orientere sig mod Rusland, som ikke har haft mod til at sige det. Jeg tænker – da jeg var i Sverige sidste efterår, talte vi om, at hjernevasken imod Rusland var spektakulær! Man tror, det er slemt her, og det er slemt her, men jeg havde en nær ven, der boede på Gotland, denne ø mellem Sverige og de baltiske lande, og hun var fuldstændig overbevist om, at der er russiske spioner overalt på øen! Og det svenske militær må opruste for at forberede sig på en russisk invasion.

Jeg mener, at et skifte i USA sluttelig kunne give en masse optimisme. Men det bliver interessant; jeg tror, det bliver meget ulige fordelt, og jeg tror, det vil forårsage nogle uventede resultater.

https://larouchepac.com/20170401/manhtattan-town-hall-event-diane-sare

Michelle start på 46 min.